Healthcare IT Strategy

May 11, 2012

EHR–“Our Lady of Perpetual Implementations”

Filed under: EMR,healthcare 2.0,Hospital,informatics,planning — Paul Roemer @ 1:06 pm

“There is no use trying,” said Alice;
“one can’t believe impossible things.”
“I dare say you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen.
“When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day.
Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as
six impossible things before breakfast.”

There are a number of people who would have you believe impossible things.  I dare say some already have.  Such as?

“My EHR is certifiable.”

“They told me it will pass meaningful use.”

“We’re not responsible for Interoperability; that happens at the RHIO.”

“It doesn’t matter what comes out of the reform effort, this EHR will handle it.”

“We don’t have to worry about our workflow, this system has its own.”

Sometimes it’s best not to follow the crowd—scores of like-thinking individuals following the EHR direction they’ve been given by vendors and Washington.  Why did you select that package—because somebody at The Hospital of Perpetual Implementations did?

There is merit in asking, is your organization guilty of drinking the Kool Aid?  Please don’t mistake my purpose in writing.  There are many benefits available to those who implement an EHR.  My point is is that there will be many more benefits to those who select the right system, to those who know what business problems they expect to address, to those who eliminate redundant business functions, and those who implement proper change management controls.

May 8, 2012

EHR’s 5 stages of grief

Filed under: EHR,healthcare 2.0,Hospital,informatics,productivity,Rants & Musings,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 8:54 am

Being a blogger is not too dissimilar to being a failure’s biographer.  Unless you simply repeat the ideas of your contemporaries, good blogging requires a certain avidity to oppugn those who revel in the notion that theirs was the only good idea.  To me, their Sang-froid calmness has all the appeal of a cold omelet.  Good writing requires that you make intellectual enemies across a range of subjects, and that you have the tenacity to hold on to those enemies.  So let us step off Chekhov’s veranda and bid farewell to the sisters of Prozorova.

The Kübler-Ross model, commonly known as the five stages of grief, was first introduced by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross in her 1969 book, On Death and Dying.  I heard a story about this on NPR, and it made me think about other scenarios where these stages might apply.

My first powered form of transport was a green Suzuki 250cc motorcycle.  My girlfriend knitted me a green scarf to match the bike.  One afternoon my mother walked into the family room, saw me, and burst into tears.  When I asked her what was wrong, she told me that one her way home she saw a green motorcycle lying on the road surrounded by police cars and an ambulance—she thought I had crashed.  I asked her why, if she thought that was me lying on the road, she did not stop.

My girlfriend’s mother, didn’t like my motorcycle—nor did she like me.  Hence, my first car; a 1969 Corvair.  Three hundred and fifty dollars.  Bench seats, AM radio.  Maroon—ish.  It reminded me a lot of Fred Flintstone’s car in that in several places one could view the street through the floor.  Twenty miles per gallon of gas, fifty miles per quart of oil.

Buyer’s remorse.  We’ve all had it.  There is a lot of buyer’s remorse going around with EHR, a lot of the five stages of grief.  I see it something like this:

  • Denial—the inability to grasp that you spent a hundred million dollars or more on EHR the wrong EHR, one that will never meet your needs
  • Anger—the EHR sales person received a six-figure bonus, and you got a commemorative coffee mug.  The vendor’s VP of Ruin MY life, took you off his speed dial, unfriended you in Facebook, and has blocked your Tweets. You phone calls to the vendor executive go unanswered, and are returned by a junior sales rep who thinks the issue may be that you need to purchase additional training.
  • Bargaining—when you have to answer to your boss, likely the same person who told you which system to purchase, as to why productivity is below what it was when the physicians charted in crayon.
  • Depression—you come in at least fifteen minutes late, and use the side door, taking the stairs so you won’t see anyone.  You just stare at your desk; but it looks like you are working. You do that for probably another hour after lunch, too. You estimate that in a given week you probably only do about fifteen minutes of real, actual, work. (Borrowed from the movie, Office Space.)
  • Acceptance—the EHR does not work, it will never work, you won’t be around to see it if it ever does.  Your hospital won’t see a nickel of the ARRA money.  You realize the lake house you were building will never be yours, but the mortgage will be.

The five stages of EHR grief.  Where are you in the grieving process?

True, there are a handful of EHR successes.  Not nearly as many as the vendors would have you believe.  More than half of hospital EHR implementations are considered to have failed.

If you are just starting the process, or are knee-deep in vendor apathy you have two options.  You can bring in the A-team, people who know how to run big ugly projects, or you prepare to grieve.

If it was me, I’d be checking Facebook to see if I was still on my vendor’s list of friends.

March 15, 2012

ICD-10′s Hidden Cost

Filed under: healthcare 2.0,healthcare costs,Hospital,ICD-10,planning,Rants & Musings — Paul Roemer @ 4:15 pm

The characters on the train into Philadelphia, while never dull, were more interesting than usual this morning.  The woman across the aisle from me wore her hair in a style that could be described best as resembling a termite mound.  The ride felt so much like bumper cars that I was tempted to ask the driver if he had to pass some sort of training program to get his license, or if all he had to do was to collect a certain number of bottle caps.  It gives me the feeling that there should be a lifeguard at the gene pool.

The med student seated next to me on the train reads his book, but then, everyone one the train reads. I asked him what he was reading.  Turns out it was a book about converting from ICD-9 to ICD-10.  Medical coding.  Those little numbers, charge codes, on your doctor’s invoice that enable the doctor to charge you for the specific services provided.  There didn’t seem to be much of a plot, and he did not seem to be very engrossed in the material.

The conversion from ICD-9 to ICD-10 may be the biggest gotcha on healthcare’s horizon, especially with regard to hospitals.

Money will be spent and money will be lost—lots of it.

Health and Human Services (HHS) estimates that the cost of converting can be broken down into three categories, and it estimate the relative cost of those categories:

  • Training                              22%
  • Lost productivity               35%
  • System changes                43%

Two of these, training and system changes, are controlled variables.  They relate to things the service provider will be doing.  The other, lost productivity is the result of how well the service provider managed the other two.

HHS estimates productivity charges will range from 6-10% due to the fact that it will take people between 500 and 1,000 hours to become proficient in the new codes.  Others have estimated that for hospitals with more than 500 beds the total cost of the conversion (actual cost plus opportunity cost) will be more than ten million dollars.

So, in layman’s terms, what does that mean with regard to the business of managing the hospital?  How does one develop a project plan for lost productivity?  What are the tasks?

Let’s look at what is involved.

System Changes:

Everything will be changing; business rules, business processes, forms, reports, and systems.  Ask yourself which systems that you use involve coding?  Now ask yourself if you like using those systems.  Are they easy to use?  Are they easily understood?  If the only thing changed in those systems is the codes, they will still be just as tedious to use and those systems will be less usable.

A large hospital will spend five million or more dollars to change systems and the end result will be that those systems, at least for the first 500 to 1,000 hours will be less usable.  I believe those hours are underestimated.  Most systems are tied to other systems into what has become a bit of a kluge.  Changing integrated systems is a lot like playing the children’s game Pick Up Sticks—touching one stick often winds up making things happen to the other sticks.  Changing one system will cause things to happen to the other systems.  Ineffectiveness breeds more ineffectiveness.

Lost Productivity:

According to estimates, thirty-five cents out of every dollar spent on the conversion will be allocated to lost productivity.  This is like buying a gallon of milk and having to pour a third of it in the sink before you placed the carton in the refrigerator.

What are the why’s and where’s of the productivity loss, and what can be done about it?  Interpreting the HHS estimates, they are essentially stating that while the conversion will be done, it will not be done well.  In fact, those in the know published that hundreds of millions of dollars will be lost converting to ICD-10.

Will your hospital be contributing to that loss?  Without question; unless you figure out the causal factors of that loss, and put a plan in place to prevent it.  HHS calculates hospitals will lose thirty-five cents on the dollar even after having spent twenty-two cents of every dollar to train people.

Plan on fifty-seven cents of every dollar spent on the conversion to ICD-10 being wasted.  Get that milk carton out of the refrigerator and pour some more into the sink.

Training:

The training program envisioned by HHS that hospitals will undertake will result in a planned productivity loss of thirty-five percent.  What will your productivity loss be if your training program is less effective than whatever HHS was envisioning?  Clearly they are not holding out high hope for the success of ICD-10 training given that it is estimated that becoming proficient in the new coding could take one thousand hours.  (It only takes about 50 hours of training to obtain a private pilot’s license.)

Training, the variable over which a hospital has the most control is the area where the hospital has the least experience.  After all, the hospital has never had a business system designer design an ICD-10 training program.

Training will be about learning to use correctly new screens and forms and new business processes and business rules.  It must include those in finance and IT, coders, and healthcare professionals.  To be effective, it should be role-based; customized.

Left up to the usual way of doing it, hospitals will provide classroom study, 24-40 hours. They will probably develop a train-the-trainers program, and the trainees will be presented with a nice-looking ICD-10 training certificate.  Good luck.

Training may be needed for more than half of a hospital’s employees.  For training to be effective and to minimize the loss of productivity it must be designed.  It must include:

  • What will the altered systems user interface (UI) look like
  • Should people be trained on that UI, or will changing the UI result in much less training
  • What will the altered forms look like
  • Should people be trained on those forms, or could designing new forms result in much less training
  • Can the training be designed to be delivered online
  • Can the training be designed to be delivered on portable devices
  • Can the training be designed by roles
  • Can the training be designed by person to assess what areas need more training

The answers to these questions are Yes.  Whether it will be is up to you.  Designing a training program will significantly decrease the cost of training and significantly decrease the productivity loss.

March 9, 2012

What EHR users really want

Filed under: EHR,Hospital,informatics,productivity,usability,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 11:51 am

I just read an article in the Harvard Business Review about the notion of what Henry Ford would have said if he were asked what people wanted.  The oft-quoted response was “Faster horses.”

At one point Ford had two-thirds of the market.  A few years later Ford’s share had dropped to fifteen percent.  Those in the know suggest this drop accrued to the fact that the customers did not want faster horses; they wanted better cars.

This is somewhat in line with how the healthcare providers have responded to EHR systems.  The hospitals with whom I have spoken have made a wide range of choices with regard to what they are doing with their EHR.

  • They use it because they have no other choice
  • They continue to do paper charting and use the EHR after the fact
  • They use it as a document management system and continue to dictate
  • They use the monitor as a flashlight to help them see while they write their notes
  • They sign a petition stating they are not going to use the EHR that is being forced upon them
  • They change EHRs believing that anything else has to be better than the system they are using

These are all variations of the faster horse theory of EHR.

What EHR’s users want is a better EHR, one that helps them do their job rather than one that hinders them.

Is Your EHR More Like iPhone Or iTunes?

Filed under: EHR,Hospital,informatics,innovation,productivity,usability,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 10:18 am

Below is my latest post on healthsystemcio.com.  Let me know what you think.

Times are perilous, and they ain’t a-changin.  As Europe focuses its attention on whether the Euro will become a collector’s item, and the Middle East eagerly awaits the chance to lower the amount it pays for air conditioning because of the surplus of electricity that will be available from all of Iran’s nuclear reactors, America is all a-twitter about what Angelina Jolie was wearing at the Oscars.

No wonder the impact of the billions being spent on healthcare IT has taken a back seat.

Ask yourself, how good is your EHR? Does it do what you want it to do? Does it do it in the way you need it to do it? If it was your decision, would you have spent a hundred or two-hundred million dollars for it?

Okay, get the smirk off your face.

I have been writing recently a lot about the difference between user acceptance (UA) and the usability of large business systems like EHR systems. A business system is a lot more than an IT application. It also includes process and people — users.

Achieving high user acceptance is easy. Implement one system and make everyone use it. Check the box. User acceptance only involves the IT application: the EHR. UA does not measure the value of the business system to the users; it simply measures the percentage of users.

Usability is a testament to whether or not the system, in this case the EHR, adds value to the organization, to its users. Does it make them better, more effective, more efficient? The secret sauce towards achieving good usability is the addition of design.

Here is an example of a company with two business systems depicting the difference between UA and usability. The company is Apple, the two business systems are the iPhone and iTunes.

iPhone system:

  • Phone, camera, game player, GPS, email, SMS, MP3 player
  • One button
  • No training required
  • Great usability

iTunes system:

  • Web shopping program for purchasing services to use on Apple products
  • Full keyboard
  • High learning curve
  • Poor usability, poor user experience
  • High UA — users have no other choice

Brothers from different mothers. Their usability is so different that it is difficult to believe both business systems came from the same company.

  • One business system lets you do everything using one button; the other barely lets you do anything using 61 keys.
  • One is intuitive, one is anything but

I am willing to bet your EHR reminds your users more of iTunes than it does the iPhone. You can choose to accept it as is, or you can make it better. The great thing about business systems, unlike products, is you can choose to apply design to a poor business system and gain tremendous value for little investment. Or not.

February 29, 2012

Redux–What people at HIMSS were afraid to say

Filed under: EHR,General HIT,Hospital,informatics,Interoperability,meaningful use,Rants & Musings,Vendors-What's not to like?,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 11:22 am

One image of HIMSS that will not escape my mind is the movie Capricorn One—one of OJ’s non-slasher films.  For those who have not seen it, the movie centers on the first manned trip to Mars.  A NASA Mars mission won’t work, and its funding is endangered, so feds decide to fake it just this once. But then they have to keep the secret…

The astronauts are pulled off the ship just before launch by shadowy government types and whisked off to a film studio in the desert.  The space vehicle has a major defect which NASA just daren’t admit. At the studio, over a course of months, the astronauts are forced to act out the journey and the landing to trick the world into believing they have made the trip.

Upon the return trip to Earth, the empty spacecraft unexpectedly burns up due to a faulty heat shield during reentry. The captive astronauts realize that officials can never release them as it would expose the government’s elaborate hoax.

I think much of what I saw at the show was healthcare’s version of Capricorn One.  Nothing deliberately misleading, or meant as a cover-up or a hoax.  Rather more like highlighting a single grain of sand and trying to get others to believe the grain of sand in an entire beach.

The sets for interoperability and HIEs served as the Martian landscape, minus any red dust.  There was a wall behind the stage from where the presentation interoperability was shown.  I was tempted to sneak behind it to see if I could find the Wizard, the one pulling all the nobs and using the smoke and mirrors to such great effect.  It was an attempt to make believers, to make people believe the national healthcare network is coming together, to make us believe it is working today and that it is coming soon to a theater near you.

After all, it must be real; we saw it.  People wearing hats and shirts emblazoned with interoperability were telling us this was so, and they would not lie to you.

The big-wigs, and former big-wigs—kudos to Dr. B. for all his hard work—were at the show for everyone to see, and to add a smidgen of credibility to the message.  They would not say this was going to happen if it were not—Toto, say this ain’t true.

The public relations were perfect, a little too perfect if you asked me.  Everyone was on message.  If you live in Oz and go to bed tonight believing all is right with the world, stop reading now.  If what you wanted from HIMSS was a warm and fuzzy feeling that everything is under control and that someone really has a plan to make everything work you probably loved it.

Here is the truth as this reporter saw it.  This is not for the squeamish, and some of it may be offensive to children under thirteen or C-suiters over forty.  In the general sessions nobody dared speak to the fact that:

  • Most large EHR implementations are failing.
  • Meaningful Use isn’t, and most hospitals will fail to meet it.
  • Hospital productivity is falling faster than are the Cubs chances of winning a pennant.
  • Most hospitals changed their business model to chase the check
  • Most providers will not see a nickel of the ARRA money—the check is not in the mail and it may never be.

The future as they see it is not here, and may never be, at least until someone comes up with a viable plan.  Indeed, CMS and the ONC have altered the future, but it ain’t what it used to be.  People speak to the need to disrupt healthcare.  Disrupt it is exactly what they have done.  The question is what will it cost to undo the disruption once reason reenters the equation?  What then is the future for many hospitals?

  • Hospitals on the whole will lose more much more money due to failing to be ready for ICD-10 than they will ever have seen through the ARRA lottery.
  • It make take years to recover the productivity loses from EHR and the recoup those revenues.
  • Hospitals spending money to design their systems to tie them into the mythical HIE/N-HIN beast will spend millions redesigning them to adapt to the real interconnect solution.
  • The real interconnect solution will be built bottom-up, from patients and their primary care physicians.
  • Standardized EMRs will reside in the cloud and patients will use the next generation of smart devices.  And like it or not, the winners will be Apple, Google, and Microsoft, not the ONC and CMS.  Why?  Because that is who real people go to to buy technology and applications.  A doctor still does not know which EHR to buy or how to make it work.  Give that same doctor a chance to buy a solution on a device like an iPad and the line of customers will circle the block.

And when doctors are not seeing patients they can use the device to listen to Celine Dion.  This goes to show you there are flaws with every idea, even some of mine.

(I published this post one year ago, just after the Orlando HIMSS.  It appears to still be valid today. Comments?)

February 24, 2012

The True Measure Of Success For HIT Systems

Filed under: EHR,Hospital,meaningful use,productivity,Rants & Musings,usability,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 10:52 am

My newest post in healthsystemcio.com.  Feedback appreciated.

The title of the book on the lap of the person sitting next to me was “Cost Justifying Usability”. My cynicism jumped immediately to Def-Con 4.

Cost Justifying Usability. Did the author get his inspiration for the title at the Shopping-For-New-Ideas store? Now, before you laugh too hard, recall that many inane ideas make gobs of money, such as thePet Rock and Chia Pet. For every book, there must be an audience. I can only believe that the intended audience for this epic must be senior business executives.

Imagine yourself being one of those executives. Someone finds you lying on the floor in the fetal position and suggests you read the book. How should you respond?

  • I assumed usability was the antecedent  for buying that system
  • We just spent $300 million dollars on an enterprise system. Does making it usable cost extra?
  • They told us the drop-dead date is March 21. Drop-dead is the perfect phrase; we only measured cost and speed — nobody thought to measure usability?

What is the title of the antithetical book—Cost Justifying Unusability or, Cost Justifying Failure?

The statement most in HIT are afraid to utter is that most HIT spend has no ROI. There is no ROI because the usability measure of most of the largest HIT systems (enterprise and EHR) is negative — productivity is showing a net loss instead of a net gain.

Usability is not the same as user acceptance. User acceptance for these unusable systems will approach 100 percent. Why? Because users have no other option. And then there is Meaningful Use — an odd phrase because it has nothing to do with users. An EHR can pass Meaningful Use and have low user acceptance and the usability factor of hammering a nail with a banana.

If the healthcare industry needs to be convinced that a cost justification for usability is required before anyone takes the issue seriously, perhaps a moniker change is in order — HIT to OBIT.

Call me silly, but I think the time has come to do away with how we measure the success of all business systems projects. Was the system usable — did it increase ROI, did it make the organization more effective, and did it enable innovation? Only two approaches to measure need be used.

  1. On time, on budget, high user acceptance, unusable:             failure
  2. Not on time, not within budget, usable:                                        success

No matter what else happens, if the best your business system project does is to give you back performance similar to what you had without the system, a reasoned executive would say the investment in the system was wasted. It then stands to reason that if the new system delivered worse performance than what you had previously, it too is a wasted investment.

When I talk with some seasoned executives in HIT about the success or failure of their EHR system, I pause for a second waiting for someone to say, “Pay no attention to the small man behind the curtain.” Their standard of measure? See above, Approach 1. Some would have you believe it is heretical to say that spending a hundred million dollars on a system whose usability is poor was a waste of money. Most of those who defend the spend are those who did the spending.

Ask the users if they think the money was well spent. These three quotes came from a physician whose hospital spent $400 million on a name-brand EHR.

  1. “Their (the hospital’s) most expensive resource spends a lot of time doing data entry.”
  2. “The data is very good if you are a patient or an insurance company that wants to sue us.”
  3. “My productivity is still down thirty percent.”

Imagine yourself as a hospital executive and answer the following question. Which of these two pieces of information is more valuable: knowing your EHR passed Meaningful Use or, learning from your users that the EHR is unusable? In HIT, there are two rules:

  1. The usability measure of most EHRs is unacceptable.
  2. Paying more for your EHR than the next guy or gal does not change Rule 1.

February 20, 2012

Your EHR vendor’s biggest secret

Filed under: EHR,EMR,Hospital,informatics,Rants & Musings,Vendors-What's not to like?,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 4:51 pm

I am working on a novel, my second.  It involves a serial killer. There is something richly cathartic about killing someone with bits and bytes. If you are in a bad mood, it can be calming. If the killing does not provide the calming effect I had hoped to achieve, rekilling him in a more vengeful manner usually does the trick.

The novel involves the skills of an FBI profiler. If you have read any of the books on profiling you would think it an exact science.  Chapter by chapter the writer extols the successes of profiling—this profile worked, that one worked.  According to how it is spelled out in the book, one would want to ask, if profiling is so successful, why do they not use it on every case?

Perhaps because there are unwritten chapters, chapters that never make it into the profiler’s handbook.  The reason those chapters do not make it to the book is because it sort of defeats the purpose to print cases in which the profiles that were created did not match that of the killer’s—white male in his mid-thirties, wooden leg, drives a Prius, and enjoys watching Dancing with the Stars.

When I thought about it, it occurred to me that business software is pitched a lot like profiling serial killers.  You never hear about the bits that do not work.

Think back to when you and your colleagues watched various processes of your software being demonstrated—add a patient or a customer, schedule an appointment, write a new script.  The functionality was so smooth it brought a tear of hopefulness to the eyes of the prospective users.

In a recent conversation I learned of a patient scheduling system that had more than five-thousand user screens.  That is a five followed by three zeroes; almost enough to have a separate screen for each patient.

Like the author of the book on profiling who only wrote about the cases on which his technique worked, software vendors only show potential buyers those processes that function smoothly. In an EHR system, vendors show how their software works in a real-life setting with only one thing missing, a patient with which it must interact.  A rather critical missing part of the functionality puzzle if you ask me.

The entire situation, that of acquiescing over time to having to use bad software, reminds me of the experiment of the frog and the pot of water; drop a frog in a pot of boiling water and it leaps out, place it in a pot of water and gradually raise the temperature and the frog will remain in the pot until it is cooked to death.

Users of bad software are a lot like frogs in a pot. They never quite get up the moxie needed to jump out of the pot. More often than not they allow their situation to worsen until it is too late.

January 18, 2012

Can you blame providers if they fail Meaningful Use?

Filed under: EHR,Hospital,meaningful use,Rants & Musings,reform,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 8:33 pm

I don’t wake up each day planning to be at odds with ninety-eight percent—I’m probably being overly generous assuming two percent of the people are as jaded as me—of the HIT community, maybe I just come by it naturally.

The first time I heard of RECs (regional extension centers) the first thing that came to mind was playgrounds, something akin to what the Police Athletic League might find useful.  Five hundred and ninety-eight million dollars.  They tried 597 and determined it wouldn’t be enough and figured 599 would be too much, but 598 million was just right.  Then Goldilocks made her way over to the porridge—sorry for turning left at the fairy tale ramp.

A large part of the success or failure of reform hinges on the success or failure of EHR.  Accordingly, the government made the egregious decision to manage the process of building and rolling out a national EHR down at the molecular level.  They have involved themselves at the front-end, at the vendor level, and at the back-end.  The more anxious they become, the more money they waste, adding another guise to get the healthcare providers to take their eyes off the ball.  Five hundred ninety-eight million “we’re just here to help you” dollars.

This money could be spent to pay the top EHR vendors to create one set of standards and modify their systems to fit those standards.

Meaningful Use.  Don’t get me started.  How can I fault thee; let me count the ways.  Those tested early for Meaningful Use will be examined less rigorously than those tested later.  This is like the IRS saying that if you file your taxes in February, don’t worry about those silly little math errors.  Healthcare will be the only industry whose software quality assurance check occurs after they pass the fail-safe point, the point of no return.

With good leadership providers should know EHR will pass meaningful use before implementing the system. If they fail to pass Meaningful Use, shame on them.

January 12, 2012

Will National EHR Work?

Filed under: EHR,healthcare 2.0,Hospital,NHIN,planning,Rants & Musings,Who's Running the Show? — Paul Roemer @ 9:36 am

I’ve never been mistaken as one who is subtle.  Gray is not in my patois.  I am guilty of seeing things as right and left and right and wrong.  Sometimes I stand alone, sometimes with others, but rarely am I undecided, indecisive, or caught straddling the fence.  When I think about the expression, ‘lead, follow, or get out of the way,’ I see three choices, two of which aren’t worth getting me out of bed.

I do it not of arrogance but to stimulate me, to make a point, to force a dialog, or to cause action.  Some prefer dialectic reasoning to try to resolve contradictions, that’s a subtlety I don’t have.  Like the time I left the vacuum in the middle of the living room for two weeks hoping my roommates would get the hint.  That was subtle and a failure.  I hired a housekeeper and billed them for it.

Take healthcare information technology, HIT.  One way or another I have become the polemic poster child of dissent, HIT’s eristical heretic.  I’ve been consulting for quite a while—twenty-five plus years worth of while.  Sometimes I see something that is so different from everything else I’ve seen that it causes me to pause and have a think.  Most times, the ball rattles around in my head like it’s auditioning for River Dance, and when it settles down, the concept which had led to my confusion begins to make sense to me.

This is not most times.  No matter how hard I try, I am not able to convince myself that the national EHR rollout strategy has even the slightest chance of working as designed.  Don’t tell me you haven’t had the same concern—many of you have shared similar thoughts with me.  The question is, what are we going to do about it?

Here’s my take on the matter, no subtlety whatsoever.  Are you familiar with the children’s game Mousetrap?  It’s an overly designed machined designed to perform a simple task.

Were it simply a question of how to view the current national EHR roll out strategy I would label it a Rube Goldberg strategy.  Rube’s the fellow noted for devising complex machines to perform simple tasks.  No matter how I diagram it, the present EHR approach comes out looking like multiple implementations of the same Rube Goldberg strategy.  It is over designed, overly complex.  For it to work the design requires that the national EHR system must complete as many steps as possible, through untold possible permutations, without a single failure.

Have you ever been a part of a successful launch of a national IT system that:

  • required a hundred thousand or so implementations of a parochial system
  • has been designed by 400 vendors
  • has 400 applications based on their own standards
  • has to transport different versions of health records in and out of hundreds of different regional health information networks
  • has to be interoperable
  • may result in someone’s death if it fails

Me either.

Worse yet, for there to be much of a return on investment from the reform effort, the national EHR roll out must work.  If the planning behind the national ERH strategy is indicative of the planning that has gone into reform, we should all have a long think.

I hate when people throw stones without proposing any ideas.  I offer the following—untested and unproven.  Ideas.  Ideas which either are or aren’t worthy of a further look.  I think they may be; you may prove me wrong.

For EHR to interoperate nationally, some things have to be decided.  Somebody has to be the decider.  This feel good, let the market sort this out approach is not working.  As you read these ideas, please focus on the whether the concept could be made to work, and whether doing so would increase the likelihood of a successful national EHR roll out.

  • Government redirects REC funds plus whatever else is needed to quickly mandate, force, cajole, a national set of EHR standards
    • EHR vendors who account for 90%–pick a number of you don’t like mine—use federal funds to adapt their software to the new standard
    • What happens to the other vendors—I have no idea.  Might they go out of business?  Yup.
    • EHR vendors modify their installed base to the standard
  • Some organization or multiple organizations—how many is a tactic so let’s not get caught up in who, how many, or what platform (let’s focus on whether the idea can be tweaked to make sense)—will create, staff, train its employees to roll out an EHR shrink-wrapped SaaS solution for thousands and thousands of small and solo practice
    • What package—needs to be determined
    • What cost—needs to be determined
    • How will specialists and outliers be handled—let’s figure it out
  • Study existing national networks—do not limit to the US—which permit the secure transfer of records up and down a network.  This could include businesses like airline reservations, telecommunications, OnStar, ATM/finance, Amazon, Gmail—feel free to add to the list.  It does no good to reply with why any given network won’t work.  Anyone can come up with reasons why this won’t work or why it will be difficult or costly to build or deploy.  I want to hear from people who are willing to think about how to do it.  The objective of the exercise is to see if something can be cobbled together from an existing network.  Can a national EHR system steal a group of ideas that will allow the secure transport of health records and thereby eliminate all the non-value-added middle steps (HIEs and RHIOs)?  Can a national EHR system piggyback carriage over an existing network?

We have reached the point of lead, follow, or get out of the way, and two of these are no good.

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