How daughters relate to EHR

The other night as I’m sitting on a hard bleacher watching my seven-year-olds baseball practice I noticed the mom sitting next to me looking a little forlorn. Being naturally inquisitive, I asked if everything was okay.

“I lost his glove,” she replied.

Noticing a glove on her son’s hand, she saw my look of confusion. “Not his. My husband’s. I had it with me last Thursday, and I left it here.”

“I don’t suppose this was a new glove. Judging by the look on your face I’d say this was his favorite glove; thirty years old, supple, broken in, fold flat as a sheet of paper.”

“Twenty-five years,” she corrected as she lowered her eyes.

“It’s rained the last three days,” I told her, which caused her to grimace even more. Having nothing better to do, I flayed her emotions. “I bet that glove meant the world to him. He probably planned on giving it to your son in a few years. The glove probably reminds him of some of the big events in his life, every scar, each stain on the leather, points to something important. You know, if it was outside for a few days, the field mice will have chewed on the leather.”

She brushed away a tear, and headed to the lost and found.

“Any luck?” She shook her head in despair. “In some countries, if a wife does something life that, the husband can sever the relationship, literally,” I said as I made a slashing motion with my hand. She made the briefest of smiles. At least she knew I was pulling her lariat. Reeling her in, I continued.

“You’re not thinking of spending the night at home, are you? If you are, you should at least call someone and let them know of your plans. He’ll heal over time,” I told her. “But he won’t forget it. Twenty years from now the two of you will be watching something on TV, and something will remind him of the glove YOU lost.”

Fast forward to last night. My daughter and I are getting out of the car so I can coach her and her softball team in the playoff game.

“Is your glove in the trunk?” I asked. This is after I spent several minutes grilling her at home about whether she had everything she needed for her game.

“I hope so,” she said shamelessly as I popped the trunk for her. “You hope so?” I repeated with an edge in my voice.

“It’s not here Daddy.”

I left her with her friends and drove home to look for it. Ten minutes. Nothing. For some reason, I looked in the trunk. There it was. Death by 1,000 cuts.

Does it all come down to baseball gloves?  “I hope so.”  What kind of a response is that?

Will these EHR expenditures help? I hope so.

Can you confirm for me that user satisfaction won’t fall any further? I hope so.

Are we ready for the changes coming to the business model?  I hope so.

Do you think we should continue to employ you? I hope so.

Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942

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“Who moved my cheese?”

Sometimes you find something that is too good to mess with.  The following comes from “Who Moved My Cheese” by Spenser Johnson.  It is the perfect allegory for healthcare.
Change Happens
They Keep Moving The Cheese
Anticipate Change
Get Ready For The Cheese To Move
Monitor Change
Smell The Cheese Often So You Know When It Is Getting Old
Adapt To Change Quickly
The Quicker You Let Go Of Old Cheese, The Sooner You Can Enjoy New Cheese
Change
Move With The Cheese
Enjoy Change!
Savor The Adventure And Enjoy The Taste Of New Cheese!
Be Ready To Change Quickly And Enjoy It Again & Again
They Keep Moving The Cheese.
saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

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We’re losing money, but making it up in volume.

I wrote this in response to an article in modernhealthcare.com titled New doc payment system needed
I posted this question on a dozen healthcare Linked in groups; How Can Doctors and Hospitals Make Money in a Post-Reform, Health 2.0 World?  The reason for the question was to probe for ideas for a speech I am giving in May at ICSI.
My takeaway of the responses is that every approach seems to be triage.  I see the business of healthcare, as juxtaposed to the healthcare business (the clinical side) as a 0.2 business model.  Plus or minus variants of IT, the business continues to run in much the same manner it has for the last fifty years.

Analyzing the model, it appears appears to me to be similar to the pattern created by dropping a pebble into a pond–ever expanding circles, but circles none-the-less.  Sort of a fractal business model, each fractal differing only by size.

The business of healthcare could not be facing more fundamental changes–most of which are external, most of which are unknown.  This is especially troubling for an industry whose P&Ls more closely resemble those of GM than of Apple.
It is time to stop relying on the adages, “We don’t know where we are going but we are making really good time,” and, “We’re losing money but we are making it up in volume.”
Rule number one for change–executives must admit they have a busted business model.  Rule number two–executives cannot change Rule number one.”
saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

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Microsoft EMR: It’s Not Just a Matter of When, It’s a Matter of Who

This guest post ties nicely to some of what I have been writing about regarding why I think firms like Apple, Microsoft, and Google will be the real N-HIN, why PHRs will become EMRs on super smart next gen devices.

Its author is Austin Merritt of softwareadvice.com, a web site that provides advice on selecting EHR software.  I think the strategic reason for Microsoft’s entry into EMR would not be because there are big bucks to be made from a limited number of physicians but because it gives them a foothold into two of the key stakeholders; doctors and patients, one via an EMR and the other through its PHR.  If that is where they intend to stop, they’ve wasted everyone’s time.  I think they have bigger plans, and those plans include having patients walk in to the doctor’s office, both having the same EMR on the same or compatible devices.  The rest of this post is Austin’s.

Microsoft Dynamics is largely present in just about every software market but medical. And they’re missing out big time. The United States healthcare IT market is growing at about 13% per year and is expected to reach $35 billion in 20111. The biggest opportunity for growth in the industry is among ambulatory care physician practices, partly due to the Stimulus Bill requiring the use of electronic health records (EHR) systems by 2015.

You would think Microsoft would be in such a promising industry, but you won’t find a Microsoft EHR available. The primary reason why is that EHRs are highly specialized, and Microsoft’s main products (Dynamics, CRM, and SharePoint) don’t come anywhere near the needs of physician practices. It would be very difficult for Microsoft to build an EHR from scratch and introduce it to the market. So what should Microsoft do to enter the industry? Acquire a current player.

Such an entry into the medical market would mimic the acquisition spree that Microsoft conducted between 2000 and 2002, when it acquired Great PlainsNavision, Damgaard, and several related vendors. These systems were re-branded and offered as Microsoft Dynamics. Before these acquisitions, Microsoft was not present in the enterprise resource planning (ERP) application market. Its only ERP presence was as an infrastructure vendor, licensing SQL Server databases and related platforms to support application rollouts. However, this lack of application presence gave competitors such as Oracle and SAP the opportunity to squeeze Microsoft out of the ERP infrastructure market by pushing Unix, Oracle databases and IBM DB2. By acquiring several applications, Microsoft was able to drive sales of its SQL Server and Windows Servers directly, in addition to the Dynamics applications themselves. This strategy proved effective in giving Microsoft a multi-billion dollar share of the lucrative ERP market.

Setting its sights on the medical market, Microsoft is starting to squeeze its way in with a few smaller acquisitions and developments of its own, mainly Amalga and HealthVault. However, these current medical offerings are on the periphery of the market and do not really target the sweet spot: electronic health records for physician practices. An intelligent acquisition of a large EHR player would provide a key piece of the puzzle for Microsoft’s entry into the medical market.

Acquired by Microsoft in 2006, Amalga provides information connectivity and interoperability to large healthcare networks. It is the primary Microsoft healthcare offering in the industry at this point, although it is not available in the United States. Microsoft may be planning to offer it domestically, as it did with Navision Damgaard, or may be looking to acquire a domestic vendor to complement it. Regardless of Microsoft’s strategy, Amalga still would not address the physician practice EHR market.

On the other end of the spectrum, HealthVault is a patient-managed, centralized health records solution. It is essentially designed to be a reference point for consumers, not a substitute for medical records. If Microsoft were able to introduce an EHR to the market and enable its users to make records accessible to patients, labs, specialists and pharmacies via HealthVault, then they would really be on to something. This synergy with its other products would just be an added bonus to having its own EHR.

So what would Microsoft prioritize as its key acquisition criteria when evaluating EHR targets? They would certainly want target vendors who possess the following:

  1. Large market share and name brand recognition. Microsoft usually likes to be the largest name in the business, so they would definitely want to sell a “big-name” system with which most buyers are already familiar.
  2. A scalable product for small and large practices. Microsoft would need to be able to cover a wide range of medical customers. While its bread and butter is always in the small and mid-size market, they would want scalability into the largest organizations.
  3. A .Net architecture to drag along infrastructure sales. Reinforcing the position of .Net in the medical software marketplace would be important because it would drive further sales of Microsoft infrastructure while squeezing out Unix, Oracle and IBM.
  4. An established, indirect sales channel. Microsoft historically favors selling through partners, including the existing Dynamics dealer network. An EHR vendor with a large dealer network would provide Microsoft an easily transferable sales channel and process.

So which EHR vendor should Microsoft acquire? This is where it starts to get interesting. We decided to examine Microsoft’s ten most logical targets in detail. Two very popular products, GE Healthcare’s Centricity and McKesson’s Practice Partner, did not make the top ten list. While these systems meet many criteria, the parent companies – General Electric and McKesson – are not really acquirable by Microsoft. The remaining ten are outlined below.

MARKET SHARE SCALABLE PRODUCT .NET ARCHITECTURE INDIRECT CHANNEL
NextGen
Greenway
Pulse
Aprima
Allscripts/Misys
eClinicalWorks
Eclipsys
athenaHealth
Epic
Cerner
  • NextGen – One of the “biggest names” in EHRs, NextGen focuses on medium to large enterprises. However, its system is certainly able to scale down to smaller practices. While it is often too expensive for groups with less than ten physicians, it has a strong position in the sweet spot of the market. Its .Net-based system is sold both directly and through a channel network, so NextGen is a good fit for Microsoft.
  • GreenWay – GreenWay has a nice product, but is toward the smaller end of the companies on this list. It sells primarily directly and has some channel partners. PrimeSuite 2008, its EHR and practice management sytem, is .Net-based and is popular among small and mid-sized groups. Microsoft could leverage its resources and Greenway’s technology to become a major force in the industry. Moreover, Greenway doesn’t come with any legacy of old architecture or acquired customers.
  • Pulse – Pulse has quickly climbed its way into the ranks of bigger EHR vendors and will likely stay here for some time. They were one of the first vendors to achieve 2011 CCHIT certification and are receiving a lot of buzz as a result. While the system is scalable and .Net based, Microsoft would likely want to pursue bigger fish for now.
  • Aprima – Aprima (formerly known as iMedica) has focused on its .Net framework and N-tier architecture from the beginning. As a result, its modern platform and interface make it widely received among physicians across a broad range of specialties. While Microsoft would likely focus on larger companies first, Aprima could be a nice additional partner to champion .Net.
  • AllScripts/Misys – A large brand and a publicly-traded company, it is a logical first place to look. After all, the company claims to have 160,000 physicians using its products. However, the 2008 merger between AllScripts and Misys presents the usual integration challenge, which might keep this firm busy for quite a while. Although we think the future of AllScripts/Misys is very promising, Microsoft probably wouldn’t get involved at this point.
  • eClinicalWorks – This system is probably the most ubiquitous of the list, especially among smaller practices. The recent deal to sell eClinicalWorks through WalMart will definitely increase its brand recognition and share of the market. However, the system is built in Java, an open programming language that is the traditional enterprise alternative to Microsoft .Net. Microsoft would most likely rather acquire a pure .Net system or one that is at least close to it, especially with Oracle, IBM and SAP all embracing Java.
  • Eclipsys – Eclipsys acquired MediNotes in 2009 in an attempt to move users to its Peak Practice EHR. While Eclipsys is fairly popular among hospitals, Peak Practice has not achieved similar success among small to mid-size outpatient practices. Existing MediNotes users are not thrilled about being forced to purchase Peak Practice and we’ve seen quite a few seeking a new solution from a new vendor. We think the success of the MediNotes deal is unclear and Microsoft would steer clear for now.
  • Athena – The youngest company on this list, Athena’s product offering is slightly different from the others. Its system is offered via software as a service (SaaS) and is combined with outsourced billing and revenue cycle management services. This offering is indeed unique, but not a suitable target for Microsoft due to its SaaS offering and labor-intensive service component.
  • Epic – This company possesses an interesting niche in the market. It has only 190 clients, but 150,000 physicians using its products. This is due to its focus on only the largest healthcare organizations in the United States. While this focus is great for Epic, it wouldn’t be effective for Microsoft. Epic will never be able to achieve the ubiquity in the small to mid-sized market where Microsoft dominates. It also sells direct, contrary to Microsoft’s traditional indirect sales mode.
  • Cerner – Cerner’s cash cow is Millenium, a product designed primarily for hospitals. PowerWorks, its outpatient EHR, does not possess the market share among physician practices that Millenium enjoys among hospitals. While Cerner is a recognized name, few practices consider PowerWorks. It is also an older system. Cerner would need to improve its PowerWorks offering before becoming a suitable target for Microsoft.

Although NextGen is not currently dominant amongst small practices, Microsoft could bring them downmarket. NextGen is unable to serve these smaller buyers for two reasons: 1) small practices cannot afford an enterprise expenditure; and, 2) NextGen does not want to (and maybe cannot) devote resources to chasing smaller deals. If Microsoft owned NextGen, they could double down on pursuing smaller practices, perhaps through their channel partners. They may even lower prices to buy market share and make up the difference with revenue from services, SQL licenses, and maintenance.

Which EHR do you think Microsoft should acquire?

Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942

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The McDonald’s healthcare business model

Sarah Palin continues to receive national media coverage.  Many hospitals continue to implement EHR without any measurable goals.  (One of those is bad.)

The year is 2014.  I had this dream the other night of having dropped my IQ when I was at the hospital, but I couldn’t remember which hospital, so off I went, hospital by hospital looking for my IQ—I realize there are those of you who believe this isn’t a great loss.

In the first hospital I visited, a photo of the new president hung behind the registration desk.  Next to her photo—surprised some of you with that I bet—hung the photo of the Secretary of Hospital Sameness.  For a while I wondered what someone in that position did day to day.  The more hospitals I visited, the more apparent it became.  The hospitals all looked very much alike, right down to dust on the fake Fichus tree next to the water fountain.  For a while I thought that maybe I was driving in circles until I noticed that even though receptionists were all named Gladys, they wore different clothes.  It was almost like visiting Stepford.

Does anyone have the sense that what reform will really accomplish is to reform away healthcare competition?  There appears to be a move afoot towards the efficiency that is created by sameness—what I call the McDonalds healthcare model.  Put one on every corner.  Make them identical.  Limit the options.  Everyone gets a burger.  Nobody gets a steak.

Eliminate waste.  Does that mean eliminate ways of operating that differ from how the government permits them to operate?  There is talk of pulling costs out of the system thereby making it more efficient.  You tell me.  Is the argument that there is so much inefficiency that by becoming efficient not only will we be able to cover everyone, but we will be able to do it at a cost below what it costs to care for far fewer people?

How do you understand it?  Are costs being removed, or simply moved?  If someone with no access to healthcare suddenly has healthcare—a good thing by almost anyone’s standards—the reasoned person knows costs have just increased.  (Healthcare theorem 1:  The cost to provide healthcare to 2 people is greater than or equal to the cost to provide it to one person.)  If costs have increased, how does one make a believable argument that the basis for reform is cost reduction?

I try hard not to be too cynical, but sometimes I think, why bother.  By the way, I found my IQ.  Thanks for asking.

saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

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Does it come in blue?

The store for audiophile wannabe’s. Denver, Colorado. The first store I hit after blowing an entire paycheck at REI when I moved to Colorado. 

The first thing I noticed was the lack of clutter, the lack of inventory. There were no amplifiers, because amplifiers were down market. There were a dozen or so each of the pre-amps, tuners, turntables, reel to reel tape decks, and these things called CD players. They also had dozens of speakers. At the back of the store was an enclosed 10 x 10 foot sound proof room with a leather chair positioned dead center.

When the ponytailed salesperson asked about my budget, like a rube I told him I didn’t have one. He beamed and took that to mean it was unlimited. It really meant I hadn’t thought of one. He asked me what I liked to listen to.

“Pink Floyd, Dark Side of the Moon.”

Within a few seconds I was seated in Captain Kirk’s chair, and Pink Floyd’s Brain Damage filled the room in pure digital quadraphonic sound. I was in love.

I lived a block and a half away. Since the equipment wouldn’t fit in my Triumph, I made several trips carrying home my new toys—gold plated monster cable, solid maple speakers that rested on nails so as to minimize distortion, a pre-amp, tuner, receiver, turntable, and stylus.

It wasn’t that I deliberately bought stuff I didn’t need. I walked in uneducated. I had never bought what I was looking at. I didn’t know how much to spend, nor what it would do for me. Looking back at that purchase decision, I bought specs I didn’t need. I didn’t realize it was possible to build audio technology that would meet performance specs beyond what I person could hear, heck beyond what anything could hear. Not understanding that possibility, I bought specs I couldn’t hear. I spent hundreds of dollars on features from which I would never receive value. You too?

It happens all the time. Stereos. Cars. Computers. Applications. Technology. Having bought it doesn’t mean it was needed, that it was the right thing to do, that it has an ROI, or that it meets the mission.

What must the ONC do to make EHR a success?

The following is my second reply to Brain Ahier’s interview of Dr. Blumenthal.  The purpose of this post was to outline some steps the ONC could take to retrofit its EHR strategy.  PLease let me know what you think.

Grab a soft-drink—this one is rather long. Please forgive any formatting mistakes–it looked good in Word.

I have never been one who thinks hit-and-run critiquing is fair. It is too easy to throw metaphorical tomatoes at an idea with which you disagree. As such, perhaps instead of just being critical of the national EHR rollout plan, here are a few ideas which may be worth exploring in more detail.

It just occurred to me that the ONC’s role, the Office of the National Coordinator, is just that—coordination. Who or what is the ONC supposed to be coordinating—among its various functions, or the providers? There are the coordinators, and its constituents—the uncoordinated. I know at least one provider who already spent $400 million on its EHR. They didn’t get coordinated. I asked one of their executives who played a major oversight role in the implementation, with whom they worked at the ONC. She was not even familiar with the acronym.

I don’t think providers are looking to be coordinated—they are looking to be led. I also think they are looking to be asked and to be heard. They are looking for answers to basic questions like; why should we do this, what is in it for me—this has nothing to do with incentive dollars?

It often seems like the ONC has developed many solutions seeking a problem, filling their tool bag in the hope they brought along the right one. This is where I think we see a good portion of the disconnect. It is better to say we know where we are going, but getting there slowly, instead of, we don’t know where we are going but we are making really good time.

People don’t buy drills because they need a drill—they buy them because they need—say it with me—holes. Providers need holes, not HIEs and RECs.

You understand the pressures you face much better than do I. Has anyone from the ONC asked you if they should reconsider their plan, their approach, their timing? Chances are good that you are not implementing EHR and CPOE because you have a vision or a business imperative of someday being able to connect your EHR to Our Lady of Perpetual Interoperability. CIOs and their peers are not spending eight or nine figures because you want a virtual national healthcare infrastructure. The C-team is investing its scarce resources to make its operation better, to reap the rewards of the promise of EHR.

The ONC is spending its resources towards a different goal, a virtual national healthcare infrastructure. The two goals do not necessarily overlap. I am reminded of the photo showing the driving of the Golden Spike—the connecting of the Union Pacific Railroad to the Central Pacific Railroad—the final link of the Transcontinental Railroad that in the 1870’s allowed Americans to cross the US by rail. What would have happened had the two railroads worked independently of each other? They would have built very nice railroads whose tracks would never have met, tracks dead ending in the middle of nowhere. Even if they almost met, say got within a few feet of each other, they would have failed.

There are those who see the work of the ONC as a real value-add. I dare say that most of those are not hospital CIOs or physicians. Both groups define value-add and success differently.

This is not to say that providers would not accept all the help they can get. However, providers want the help to be…what is the word I am searching for—helpful—to them, to their issues. The ONC’s mission will not work until the providers successfully deliver what the ONC needs from them. How many providers must be Stage 7, Meaningful Use, Certified compliant for the virtual national healthcare infrastructure to work? Fifty percent? Eighty? Who knows.

So, the providers own the critical path. It is all about the providers, bringing fully functional EHR systems to hospitals and physicians. The numbers I have seen do not paint a promising picture. The critical path is in critical condition. Ten percent hospital acceptance and a sixty percent failure rate. Let’s say those numbers are wrong by a factor of three—thirty percent acceptance, and a twenty percent failure rate. Even those numbers do not bode well for ever achieving a virtual national healthcare infrastructure under the current plan. Subtract from those figures—supply your own if you would like—the churn figures—those hospitals that are on their second or third installation of EHR. Something is amiss.

In a more perfect world the ONC might consider shifting course to something aligned with the following:

• Segment its mission into two parts; one to build a virtual national healthcare infrastructure, and two, provide hands-on support individual hospitals’ and providers’ EHR initiatives.
• Standards
• Standards—I wrote that twice because it is important to both missions
o Let us be honest, the largest EHR vendors do not want standards. Why? Because if all else fails, their standards become the standards. They don’t phrase it this way, but one can assume, their business model calls for them to do what is best for them.
o The vendors do not want to open their APIs to the HIEs
• Do not set dates for providers which to be met require meeting rules which do not yet exist. If the government wants providers to meet its dates, the government must first meet some of its critical success factors—standards, for example.
• Mandate vendor standards for however many vendors make up ninety percent of the EHR install base for hospitals. Give vendors 18-24 months to agree to a set of standards and have them retrofit their applications.
• Use a garrote and stick approach on the vendors. Create a standards incentive program, heck, underwrite it. Pay the vendors to develop and get on a single set of standards—this will have a much more positive impact than REC and PR money. Many will say, especially those who have an incentive for this not to happen, this cannot be done. Of course it can.
• Processes. EHRs are failing in part due to not enough user involvement, not enough user authority and governance. There is no usable decompositionable process map of how a hospital functions. No Level Zero through Level Whatever You Need. No industry standard, mega-diagram, boxes and arrows, which can be laid on a table or hung on a wall that shows, “This is what we do. This is how it all ties together.”
• I am building this process map, along with a colleague. Why isn’t the ONC? It will not match you hospital. It may not match anyone’s hospital. What it will do is give someone a great base from which they can edit it. Why is this important? Because it will enable the users, IT, and the vendor to overlay the EHR application to show:

o which business and clinical areas are impacted
o the process interfaces
o duplicated processes
o processes with no value-add
o which other facilities have similar and differing processes
o where change management resources must be focused
o what needs to happen if an acquisition is made

The ONC must move from coordinating to leading. To do that they need the authority to mandate the execution of some of the items listed above.

saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

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My remarks to Brian Ahier’s insightful interview of Dr. Blumenthal

I encourage those who have not read Brian’s interview of Dr. Blumenthal on HealthSystemCIO.com to make time to read it.  http://healthsystemcio.com/2010/03/27/chatting-with-the-national-coordinator-for-health-it/#comments

Brian also has a link to the audio.

Brian asked me to comment, and I was pleased to do so.  Here is what I wrote.

I enjoyed reading your interview with Dr. Blumenthal. Clearly he and the members of his team are working very hard on a number of difficult and rather diverse issues.

I have been wondering, how does one tell the story of EHR to someone who has no understanding of EHR? Not the story about the EHR system in a physician’s office, or the ungainly one in a hospital. The story to which I refer is the story of the national rollout of EHR and the drive for interoperability.

For me, the question of how to tell the story in a way to make it understandable raises a number of other questions. Is there a story, or is it a collection of short stories written by different people, guided by different principles and goals? Is there a plot? Does the story come together in a natural manner?

Sticking with the story theme for a moment—who are the main characters, do they relate to one another? Does it come to a meaningful conclusion, in fact, does it conclude?

Look at the various antagonists—EMR, EHR, PRH, Meaningful Use, Certification, HIEs, RECs, the N-HIN, interoperability, the ONC, CMS, ARRA, standards, vendors, and PR. I am sure I missed several.

Imagine if Random House allocated millions of dollars to publish and market a book which had yet to be put to paper. No plot, no outline. What if they hired a dozen writers, each with their own areas of expertise—and lack of expertise—and crossed their fingers.

Would they be more successful if they offered penalties and incentives to the writers—a garrote and stick approach? What if they changed the rules after the writers started? What if they left undefined numerous areas of rules, rules which will impact the story, and told the writers to keep pushing ahead?

I do not see how the national EHR rollout story comes together. Now or some distant tomorrow—at least not under this approach. Is the approach viable? Having a few disparate successes does not make me a believer. Call me a cock-eyed nihilist.
Once every so often, an announcement is made that another single hospital reached Stage 7. One among thousands. Why do I view this from the vantage point of a glass half-empty? For me, the existing approach is one of guidance and facilitation. There are no long lines of providers trying to beat the others to the front of the EHR line. There have been several hundred million dollar do-overs.

If we circle back to the providers for a second, three of the largest causes of failure include the arbitrary setting of go-live dates without knowing what needs to be done or can be done in that time frame; second, letting IT and the vendor drive and manage the project; third, not getting users to define what they need and then having IT replicate those needs. IT does not need an EHR.

As I look at the government’s national rollout of EHR I see the same three problems. Who are the government’s users? Doctors, clinicians, and hospitals. There are fixed dates, many having undefined requirements. These are causing some providers to dash for the cash. Who is driving the rollout—the government’s users, or the government. They way the rollout is structured, the users have all of the responsibility and little of the authority. This is a government led IT project. Where are their users? They are running their practices and hospitals. They have one ear open towards, reform, another to the garrote and stick project rollout approach, another to EHR, and yet another to their business model. They have run out of ears.

Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942

My profiles: WordPressLinkedInTwitterMeetupBlog RSS

EHR-the 40 chicken crocodile

Got a couple hundred million burning a hole in your pocket?  Why not buy an EHR?  Indeed.

Riddle me this Batman, “What is a 40 chicken crocodile?”

It is the number of chickens you have to feed it each day to keep it from eating you. What is the crocodile at your hospital?  Is it your EHR?

Let me recount to you a true story about the details of one of the EHR “success” stories.  A major hospital who selected their EHR from among one of what I like to call the oligopoly EHR Flavor of the Month Club.  You know the suspects.

Permit me to throw a wrench to those clairvoyants who think they know where this is going before I’ve even written it.  Admittedly, I have a tendency to throw metaphorical tomatoes in one direction—that of the vendors.  That’s because, they are often easy targets.  Slow down Pepito.

This hospital, and from what I was told, the vendor, did it right.  I am not sure I would have differed from the approach of either.  The hospital spent a few years in its vendor selection process, and they were very thorough.  They spent two years building their process maps, ensuring the vendor implemented the EHR to meet their needs, not the other way around.  Operations led the nine-figure project.

They implemented many of the support functions and a few of the specialty functions.  Here come the chickens.  After implementation, cash flow dropped by 80 percent for several months due to significant issues they encountered cleaning up the revenue side.  Doctors were instructed to cut their hours by fifty percent to allow them to learn to use the system.  Hours are still down by twenty percent, well more than a year later.  Users use about one-third of the functionality, even after a rigorous training program.

The hospital held off doing most of the clinical implementations for two years.

I asked for some recommendations.  What would you have done differently?  Here’s what I learned.  If you have a research organization you need to spend extra special attention to their workflows.  Managing post-go-live was a big issue to begin to offset productivity losses. Without a continuous process improvement program the EHR would not have been accepted. Do not pick a go-live date at the outset of the project as it causes the organization to be paralyzed simply to hit the date.  Testing was compromised to meet the go-live date. The post go-live issues are still being fought.  Do not let the design or build teams skimp on either reporting or testing, they are still playing catch-up.

So, after doing a pretty bang up job, at least from where I sit, there are still a lot of chickens being fed to the crocodile.  Wonder how many chickens it would have taken had the users not been as involved as they were.  How many had the users not spent two years pre-build defining processes?  A lot.  Now comes the rest of the clinical effort.  See you at the poultry counter.

saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

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What if hospital business models weren’t so tribal?

I tend to look at it from the perspective of the business model of many hospitals.  How does one transform a 0.2 business model to function in today’s let alone tomorrow’s changing healthcare model?

The clinical side of healthcare, the healthcare business, in juxtaposition to the business of healthcare, would never quarter to the idea of buying millions of dollars of technology without first knowing how they were going to use it.

Plenty can be gained by applying what other industries have done to become more effective.  In some respects the inherent structure, cost duplication, and rigid departmental silos remind me a lot of how the various agencies under Homeland Security function, operating in isolation, performing much of the same work, and not sharing information.

Other industries operate with a much less tribal model than healthcare.  Hospitals have created tribes and tribal chiefs.  In some hospitals the tribes have names like radiology, general surgery, psychiatry, and OBG/YN.  Other hospitals have redundant tribes named admissions, human resources, IT, and payroll.  Each tribe is run by the tribe’s chief.  The chief’s dominant weapon is his or her budget which is lorded over its individual tribe, and a dispute vehicle of the other tribes.

The tribal organization is more a reflection of how the hospital evolved over the years, not a result of an inept business strategy.  Nobody set out to build an ineffective and internally competitive model, or one that duplicated support functions.  Acquisitions have reinforced and exacerbated the problem, duplicating and increasing costs without yielding a resultant increase in value.

Before the business of healthcare is prepared to cope with the unknowns of the myriad of external influences it will face in the next few years, it must first change how it functions under its current structure.  It might begin by revisiting its present structure and making sure that its performance and quality precede the application of technology.

I frown on using the term efficient.  To me, efficiency implies speed, and doing bad things faster is no solution.  Let us work at improving effectiveness and good things will happen.

saint Paul M. Roemer
Chief Imaginist, Healthcare IT Strategy

1475 Luna Drive, Downingtown, PA 19335
+1 (484) 885-6942
paulroemer@healthcareitstrategy.com

My profiles: LinkedInWordPressTwitterMeetupBlog RSS
Contact me: Google Talk/paulroemer Skype/paulroemer Google Wave/paulroemer