Is the C-suite Fiddling while EHR Burns?

There is an adage in the military—different spanks for different ranks.  If speaks to a double standard, the less egregious their punishment for similar offenses, similar misjudgments.

We see that every day in business, and we see it a lot in healthcare, especially in hospitals.  Physicians are held accountable for medical errors.  Hospitals pay millions for malpractice insurance knowing that mistakes will be made and people will be held accountable for their mistakes.

But what about on the business side?  Who is held accountable for business mistakes?  An acquisition that failed to deliver.  An expensive new service offering that bled the company dry.  A decline in the number of patients. The failure of a major IT initiative to deliver results.

Take EHR.  Some of you are saying, “Yes, please take it.”

  • Around sixty percent of the large EHR projects have failed in one respect or another
  • Most will not receive ARRA incentives
  • A large number of hospitals are on their second implementation of EHR
  • Some have productivity losses of thirty percent

Who is going to be fired for the two hundred million dollar misstep?  The board?  Never.  The CEO—no.  The COO or CFO?  Unlikely.  The CIO?  That is the safe bet.

Did the CIO authorize the expenditure?  Nope.  Did the CIO get all the dollars needed to be successful, all the user support?  Unlikely.

In most cases the CIO has all of the responsibility and only some of the authority.  There are a handful of people in each organization tasked with the oversight of the large project.  They are the ones who should be asking the right questions, the ones who should be demanding answers.

A failed project, a failed strategy should not come as a surprise.  The only people who will be wearing EHR 2.0 T-shirts are those who authorized EHR 1.0.  How come these individuals are not accountable?

Whatever happened to Healthcare Reform?

I wrote a piece last year titled ‘Robbing Peter to Pay Paul’.  Yesterday I read a thoughtful post by Kim Chandler McDonald which offered a very similar albeit somewhat different perspective on the topic of where the focus on healthcare really lies.  Kim wrote on ‘meHealth’, taking the responsibility for eHealth as the only real way to create an ROI in the space http://ow.ly/5NCPN.  For those who enjoy reading something by someone who knows the difference between an adverb and a potted plant and can actually write a proper sentence I encourage you to take a read.

Mine was on heCare and sheCare and it also speaks to the individual but does so without any attempt to disguise my belief that healthcare reform missed the mark http://ow.ly/5NDet.  Kim wrote asking what if anything has changed in the period since I penned my piece.  For those who may have missed it, and to borrow from FDR, my premise was that the only thing to fear about healthcare reform was reform itself.

For all the talking that healthcare reform created, the silence on the topic has risen to a new crescendo.  The only thing that has changed concerning reform is that the silence has grown louder.

Why has reform missed the mark and what can be done about it?  Permit me a moment to illustrate.  I would ask that all the altruists reading this post take one step forward—wait a minute Sparky, where are you going?  The reform package efforted (simple past tense and past participle of effort) to be all things to all people, especially to those who have been disenfranchised under the current system.

While the goal is laudable, it did not pass the test of being both necessary and sufficient.  Its insufficiency is hampered by the fact that when we are ill altruism ends at our individual front doors.  It goes back to the notion of robbing Peter to pay Paul.  Do unto others, but do not undo unto me.

Most observers believe there is some dollar amount that contains the total spend available for healthcare and that to increase services to those less fortunate—the theyCare populous—means paying for it by removing services from those who presently have healthcare, the heCare and sheCare taxpayers.  And, it is those same people, the heCares and sheCares, whose support of reform has fallen silent.

While a rising tide may indeed lift all boats, it also drowns those tethered to the pier.

July is “take your EHR strategy to lunch month”

Several have written suggesting I toss my hat into the ring to serve as the EHR Strategy wonk or czar.  I was in the process of thinking it through when I was awakened from my fuegue state by a loud noise–my ego crashing to the floor.

Some have suggested that a camel is a horse designed by a committee.  Their point in saying that has something to do with how committees function less well than individuals–the problem with “group thinking.”  Personally, I think the camel design seems rather functional.

Some have asked, what is it about the EHR universe that has you dehorting the EHR process as though you are some sort of savant–nobody really asked that, but I wanted a segue and that’s all I came up with.

It’s the committees.  I feel a little like Quasimodo repining about the bells.  Raise your hand if you are on an EHR committee.  See?  Now, if you think that not only has the committee not accomplished much, but believe that it may never accomplish much, lower your hand.  Now look around.  Not many hands still up.

Take a few minutes and work Meaningful Use into your EHR task time-line for processes, work flows, change management, training.  Need more time?  I’d need more time than I have, and when I finished I guarantee I couldn’t explain it to anyone.  This is what happens when people get into a room, have a charter, and try to do something helpful.  I am sure they are all nice people.  But be honest, does this make your day, or does it make you want to punish your neighbor’s cat–you may have to buy them a cat if they don’t already have one.

What to do?  Here’s my take on it.  Plan.  Evaluate the plan.  Test the plan.  Know before you start that the plan can handle anything any committee tosses your way.  Let people who know how to run large projects into the room.  Seek their counsel, depend on them for their leadership.  If the plan is solid, the result has a better chance of surviving the next committee meeting

Patient Experience as experienced by the patient…

…is not a pretty picture.

At least that is how it seemed to me today during my son’s visit to a specialist at a renowned children’s hospital.  The hospital uses and equally renowned EHR–you can substitute the name of your favorite EHR and the story remains as relevant.

Actual face-time with the doc–30 minutes.  The clinical side of the patient experience was perfect. It could not have been any better–I awarded her bonus points.

Here’s the part I think most hospitals are missing.  There is another part of the Patient Experience which has little or nothing to do with the patient. It is also the part which lingers most in my memory and the one about which I am quick to repeat to others.  What part is that? It is the part that involves all of the non-clinical processes associated with the visit, such as:

  • Complete the forms-could have been done online
  • Provide the insurance information-was done the last two visits
  • Wait
  • Schedule the next appointment
  • Wait
  • Print out the results of this visit
  • Wait
  • Settle the charges
Total time spent on the non-clinical patient experience–30 minutes.
Any time a patient visit requires another family member or guardian to be present, Patient Experience Management by definition becomes Family Experience Management. Instead of poor processes wasting one person’s time, the time of two people are wasted by being inefficient and ineffective.
“How was the visit?” Asked my wife.
“Fine,” I reported. And then I spent two minutes telling her about the bad experience I had dealing with the non-clinical processes, those processes involved with running the business.
So, it was great to know my son is healthy, but we sort of knew that going in. It wasn’t great to be subjected to the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of their processes and systems.  What will I remember about that experience as I am driving him to his next appointment? Will I remember how well he is doing and how professional the doctor is?  Or, will I remember to plan for an additional thirty minutes to allow the staff to perform all of the automated business processes to check us in and out?
The purpose of this post is to get us thinking that Patient Experience Management and Family Experience Management has to do with everything that happens from the time the person enters the facility until they leave it. If the only good part of the experience occurs during the examination, then the overall patient experience as experienced by the patient can be no better than mediocre.

What did you budget for EHR?

Okay, so today was going to be one of those days when I wasn’t going to allow myself to be stupified–at least no more than was really required.

Then it sneaks up smack dab in the middle of a call, and from what I’ve been able to determine, people find it annoying if you burst out laughing on the call.  (They are not annoyed at all if you simply write about them provided they don’t read it.)

What got me going is this statement, “We’ve budgeted $X for EHR.”

Really?  You did this all by yourself?

The facts as I understood them are as follows:

  • Never bought an EHR
  • Don’t know how big they are, if they are blue or green, come gift-wrapped, or if you need two people to carry it
  • No input from vendors about EHR
  • no discussions with others about what an EHR system costs

So, with absolutely no information how does one determine how much they need to spend?  This is not like going to the supermarket for a gallon of Soy Milk–not that anyone would want to do that.

The Myth of EHR Certification

EHR certification inspectors will swarm hospitals like fifty-year-old women to a Celine Dion concert.

Why is certification a part of the overall plan?  Is this planned failure?  Do they have reason to believe that a certain percentage of EHRs will fail certification?

Of course they do.

Let’s describe two failure types; certification and Full test.  The certification test, by definition, is necessary.  The Full test is both necessary and sufficient.  It is possible to pass certification without passing the Full test.  Therefore, the Full test is a stricter test.  Build out to pass the Full test, and by default, one should pass the Certification test.

What is the full test?  Same as always.  Fully functional, on time, within budget, and user accepted.  Functional, for purposes of this discussion includes updated workflows, change management, and interoperability, and a slew of other deliverables.

Here’s what can be concluded just based on the facts.

Fact:  One-third to two-thirds of EHRs are listed as having failed—this statistic will get smaller over time.

Opinion:  The reason the failure rate will get smaller is that the failure rate will be artificially diluted by a large number of successful small-sized implementations.  Large implementations, those have far-reaching footprints for their outpatient doctors, Rhios, and other interfaces requiring interoperability will continue to fail if their PMO is driving for certification.  (Feel free to add meaningful use to the narrative, it doesn’t change the result.)

Fact:  Most large, complex, expensive IT projects fail—they just do.  This statistic has remained constant for years, and it is higher than the percentage of EHR projects that have failed.  Even a fairly high percentage of those projects which set out to pass the Full test.

Opinion:  Failure rate for large EHR projects—let’s say those above $10,000,000 (if you don’t like that number, pick your own)—as measured by the Full test, will fail at or above the rate for non-EHR IT projects.)

Bleak?  You bet.  Insurmountable?  Doesn’t have to be.

What can you do to improve your chances of success?  Find, hire, invent a killer PMO executive out of whole cloth who knows the EHR Fail Safe Points.  EHR Fail Safe Points?  The points, which if crossed unsuccessfully, place serious doubt about the project’s ability to pass the Full test.  The points which will cause success factors to be redefined, and cause one or more big requirements—time, budget, functionality—to be sacrificed.

This person need not and perhaps should not be the CMIO, the CIO, or an MD.  They need not have a slew of EHR implementation merit badges.  The people who led the Skunk Works had had zero experience managing the types of planes and rockets they built.  They were leaders, they were idea people, they were people who knew how to choose among many alternatives and would not be trapped between two.

The person need not be extremely conversant in the technical or functional intricacies of EMR.  Those skills are needed—in spades—and you need to budget for them.  The person you are looking for must be able to look you in the eye and convince you that they can do this; that they can lead, that these projects are their raison d’etre.  They will ride heard over the requirements, the selection process, the vendors, the users, and the various teams that comprise the PMO.

 

Who lost the ‘R’ in EHR’s ROI?

This is my latest post in healthsystemcio.com.

http://healthsystemcio.com/2011/07/14/standardization-lies-beyond-the-clinical-realm/#

As a parent I’ve learned there are two types of tasks–those my children won’t do the first time I ask them, and those they won’t do no matter how many times I ask them.  Here’s the segue.

Let’s agree for the moment that workflows can be parsed into two groups—Easily Repeatable Processes (ERPs) and Barely Repeatable Processes (BRPs). (I read about this concept online via Sigurd Rinde.)

An example of an ERP industry is manufacturing. Healthcare, in many respects, is a BRP industry. BRPs are characterized by collaborative events, exception handling, ad-hoc activities, extensive loss of information, little knowledge acquired and reused, and untrustworthy processes. They involve unplanned events, knowledge work, and creative work—artistes.

Then there are the ERPs.  Remember The Flintstones and I Love Lucy?  Fred Flintstone was looking at a job advert for someone to put cotton in pill bottles; and Lucy got a job boxing bon bons.  ERPs are the easy business process to map, model, and structure. They are the perfect processes for large enterprise software vendors to automate.

EHRs contain both types of business processes, BRPs and ERPs.

How can you tell what type of business processes you are trying to incorporate in your EHR? Here’s one way. If the person standing next to you at Starbucks could watch you work and accurately describe the process, it’s probably an ERP.

So, why discuss ERP and BRP in the same sentence with EHR?  The reason is simple. The taxonomy of most, if not all EHR systems, is that EHRs are designed to support ERPs. Unfortunately, most of the business processes that the EHR has to model are one-off processes, BRPs.  Healthcare providers are faced with the quintessential square peg in a round hole conundrum; trying to fit BRPs into an ERP system.

Since much of the ROI in the EHR comes from being able to redesign the workflows, it stands to reason that the ‘R’ in ROI will be sacrificed, and the ‘I’ will be much higher than planned.

On the other hand, if one looks at a hospital’s non-clinical business processes almost all of those are ERPs.  Many of them are some combination of being outdated, duplicated, and rework.  If you are looking to recover your ROI and to decrease cost, these ERPs offer a good opportunity to do both.

What do you think?

 

Suicide: The Hospital Business Model

I prefer to talk about events before they take place, not after. I don’t know if that makes me a futurist or merely someone not bright enough to understand them as they now are.  I like to have a think about things that don’t seem right.  This helps me understand what I may be missing, or if I may be on to something.

I got one of my “ah-ha” moments while driving to the airport yesterday; something I have done a few hundred times.  I could drive the route in my sleep.  I know of two ways to get there, so I really never thought about needing a third.  My bad.  One of the roads I take was flooded—the rain was so hard it appeared to be raining up.  After being stuck in traffic for twenty minutes I opted for route number two.  Five minutes later, the drenched man by the side of the road told me the bridge was out.

I found myself out of choices, poor planning on my part.  I came to a fork in the road and took it.  I still had a reasonable amount of time to make my flight.  I then found myself driving behind a nun who was driving a Rambler.  Really.  We never hit thirty on the speedometer.  I would have missed the flight had it not been delayed.

It occurred to me as I was stopped that I had failed to heed my own advice.  I was guilty of having no plan for what to do if things changed, guilty of having no options because, “I have always done things this way.”

I am speaking this afternoon about innovation and transformation for the large healthcare provider model (hospitals)—could take five minutes, could take an hour—we will have to see how many people brought tomatoes to throw.

The large provider business model is dying.  Play along with me for a minute.  How many different services and procedures are offered by the “average” hospital?   A couple thousand.  Some are performed hundreds of times each day, some on a somewhat regular basis, and some rarely.  Let’s focus on those done rarely.

The funny thing about having the ability to do something is you have to pay for the resources and technology whether you do it once or hundreds of times.  The less you do it, the larger the negative ROI.  Most large providers offer many services with negative ROIs.  How does one alter the business model to compensate for that?  Charge for parking; charge $7 for each Tylenol, outsource less profitable services.

It might be important to recognize that the reason many services—the ones most patients need—are marginally profitable is because those services are helping to fund the unprofitable services.

Sooner or later, hospitals cut loose the low-end services.  Others gobble them up, and make tremendous profits from offering them under a new business model.

I started thinking about other industries that operate under a similar business model.  The two I came up with are movie theaters and the large airlines—both which offer a service albeit not often a friendly service.  One of my early clients was the CFO of one of the country’s largest movie theater chains.  They knew their costs down to the penny.  They lose money on every movie they show.  That is why they charge eight dollars for popcorn.  Their model is broken.  Are they changing it?  No.  Others changed it.  Blockbuster did.  Then their model broke.  Now we have NetFlix.  Netflix are making lots of money and they do not even offer popcorn or JuJuBes.

Continental and United merged.  Did that make things better?  Did they stop charging for bags?  Did they offer free meals?  More seat room?  Of course not.  Combined, they are losing even more money.  Their model is broken.  Are they changing it?  No.  What are they doing—buying even bigger planes.

You know who owns fifty-five percent of the flying market?  The pesky, disruptive regional carriers.  They make lots of money.  They have a different model, and they know their costs.

Disrupting the business model and changing the way you do something are not the same.  At some point there will be nothing left to change except for what you do.  Building a need for every sub-specialty offered by EPIC is not disruptive, it is dysfunctional.  Offering the same services as every other hospital within your coverage area is not disruptive, it is duplicative.  It simply divides the revenue pie for any given procedure into smaller slices.

Hospitals know their charges, not their costs.  They can’t pull a P&L per patient, or per procedure.  How can one price an Accountable Care model without knowing the costs?  An executive at a large children’s hospital told me they have to markup the costs of little things, like pills, two-hundred and fifty percent.  Unless hospitals are prepared to disrupt their business model, they had better buy a lot more pills or start offering JuJuBes.

 

Healthcare’s pre-mortem

I call this my premortem of the large provider business model.  The new reform law is Washington’s Anschluss of the healthcare business model—the annexation of the old way of doing business.  With change, as with writing a novel, the most difficult part is to invent the end.  It is only difficult if someone actually gets to that part, the end.  Many large providers remain mired in the first chapter.

The term Ultima Thule refers to any distant place located beyond the “borders of the known world.”  That is where we are when it comes to trying to understand the implications in the realm of the known and unknown external influences on the business model of the large healthcare provider.  I tend to have a stygian mindset about how I think these influences will play out—when Washington sneezes, it is the providers who catch the cold.

Sometimes it is a matter of asking the right questions.  Unfortunately, when one asks questions, somebody always has answers.  The bad thing about answers is they often bring closure to the process of thinking.  In the short-term there may be a modus Vivendi between us—an agreement to agree to disagree, but in the long-term limiting one’s vision to the borders of the known world will prove fatal.

Gone are healthcare’s Elysian moments when leaders thought they could keep doing what they were doing as long as they did it a little better.  At some point, there are no more costs to cut.  Providers will not be able to get any Leaner.  The time has come to square the circle—something proven impossible in 1882 by Ferdinand Lindemann.  Squaring the circle is an attempt to construct a square with the same area of a given circle using Euclidian geometry.

Trying to retrofit today’s healthcare model to meet tomorrow’s business requirements seems to me to be a similar argument.  It can’t be done; you can’t get there from here.  That it cannot be done won’t stop people from trying.  The impossibility cannot be proven.  The proof will be apparent only when hospitals start to fail.  Only then will it be possible to “walk back the cat” to diagnostically deconstruct what failed hospitals should have done.

A purpose of intelligence is the ability to assess and predict.  The application of thinking and intelligence is the ability to assign relative importance to predictions.  Here’s my assessment and prediction.

To successfully change the large provider model one must disrupt it, not simply adjust it.  It has nothing to do with asking, “How can we do this better?” disruption requires that we ask, “Do we need to do this?”

For example, last week I met with the former CFO of a group of east-coast hospitals.  Each hospital had an orthopedic department.  The group also owned an orthopedic clinic.  The clinic was ranked among the top twenty orthopedic centers in the US.  None of the hospitals’ orthopedic departments was ranked in the top one hundred.  The CFO recommended the hospitals close their orthopedic departments and service those patients at the clinic.  This would improve quality and eliminate duplicative costs.  Great idea.  Unfortunately the board liked their hospitals to be able to offer all things to all people—quality and cost be damned.

Why?

Is it time to fire Winston?

I was reporting to the board—or bored—sometimes it is the same.  The mission: figure out what was wrong, and then fix it.

I spent weeks talking to everyone from the executives to the receptionist.  I interviewed patients and physicians.  The doctors were not happy, the patients less so.  Costs were up, charges were down, and quality was down.

Of all the gin joints in all the towns…

The problem was easy to decipher.  I presented my findings.

“What do you recommend?” asked the chair of the audit committee.

I tried to look lost in thought.  “I fired Winston,” I replied.

“Why Winston?”

“Winston was where it all led; quality, cost, satisfaction.  Winston was responsible for the failures.”

Several members of the board nodded, and spoke among themselves.

After several minutes I jumped back into the fray.  “The more I think about it, the more I think Winston may be salvageable—not in the same role but somewhere else in the organization.  The employees really like him.  Besides, it’s the holidays.  Do you really want to be the reason Winston is not able to buy presents for the kids?”

The board held an in camera discussion.  “Agreed.”

I knew they would.  I started with my actual presentation.  “There is no Winston.”  The Winstons scattered around the table looked perplexed.  They were looking for the easy answer to the problems in their organization, they were looking for themselves.

Who are your Winstons?